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9]CASES NOTED
LONG TERM MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS BETWEEN
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS AND
DEVELOPER-CONTROLLED MANAGEMENT
CORPORATIONS HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF
THE FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM ACT
Plaintiff, a condominium association, brought suit against a manage-
ment corporation owned and controlled by the original developers of the
condominium, seeking, inter alia, a determination that the management
contracts were void as against public policy and the requirements of the
Condominium Act,' rescission for breach of contract, and an accounting.
The original developers owned certain property upon which they created
and developed a condominium project, for which four separate declara-
tions of condominium were made, resulting in the formation of four con-
dominium associations. Prior to the sale of the condominium units to the
purchasers thereof, the developers caused long term contracts to be made
between the associations and the developer-controlled management cor-
poration for the management of the condominium associations. The indi-
vidual condominium units were then sold subject to these long term
management contracts. The trial court rejected the claims of plaintiff
for an accounting and for rescission, but held that the management con-
tracts were invalid in that they failed to comply with certain statutory
requirements and contained provisions contrary to the direction and
intent of the Condominium Act. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, affirmed, holding that the contract in question operated
to divest from the condominium association in a material and substantial
degree the power and privilege granted it by statute to operate the con-
dominium, and thus was invalid.2 On conflict certiorari,8 the Supreme
Court of Florida, in quashing a portion of the decision of the district
court of appeal, held, reversed: By placing in the condominium associa-
tions the power and duty to manage the condominium properties, the
legislature did not intend to restrict the ability of the associations to
contract for the management of the associations. Point East Management
Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973),
cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974).
The statutory condominium4 has provided a form of real estate
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 711 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as the Condominium Act].
2. Point East Mgt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 258 So. 2d 322 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1972).
3. The case deemed in conflict was Lake Mabel Dev. Corp. v. Bird, 99 Fla. 253, 126 So.
356 (1930) [hereinafter referred to as Lake Mabel].
4. As provided by statute, a "[c]ondominium is that form of ownership of condominium
property under which units of improvements are subject to ownership by one or more
owners, and there is appurtenant to each unit as part thereof an undivided share in the
common elements." FLA. STAT. § 711.03(7) (1971).
In the absence of an enabling statute, a common law condominium can be created by
contract. Several common law condominiums were established in Florida prior to the adop-
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development whereby an individual can evade today's high land cost
and maintenance expense, and still retain the benefits of owning the
fee to his unit.' The effect of limitations upon land use coupled with
the pressures of population has made Florida a locus of condominium'
growth.6 However, these same pressures have provided a market in which
developers of condominiums can engage in various abuses, often forcing
unconscionable obligations upon unwary purchasers.7
One such method of possible abuse consists of presubscription
self-dealing. 8 By statute, the operation of the condominium is the respon-
sibility of the condominium association.' The association may be incor-
porated, and if incorporated, may be either a corporation for profit or
a corporation not for profit.'0 It is further provided that the members
or stockholders of the association shall consist of the owners of units
in the condominium." Thus, after the developer has filed the declaration
of condominium, and before any units in the condominium have been
sold to the public, the developer retains complete control of the associa-
tion, by virtue of the fact that he owns all the units in the condominium.
At that time, the developer therefore has the power to bind the association
by contract, and then sell the condominium units subject to that con-
tract. 2 The power to contract might thus provide a power of abuse, in
that the developer can bind the association to a management contract,
or to land and recreation leases, with companies owned by or affiliated
with the developer.' 8
Such management contracts might be attacked on numerous grounds:
(1) the developer, as corporate officer of the condominium, assumes a
fiduciary relationship with prospective members of the association, which
relationship is breached by the self-dealing aspect of the management
contract;' 4 (2) a particular management contract is repugnant to the
Condominium Act, in that it divests the association of its statutory right
to manage the condominium; (3) since the association is incorporated,
the officers of the corporation can delegate their statutory duty to manage
tion of the Condominium Act. See McCaughan, The Florida Condominium Act Applied, 17
U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as McCaughan].
5. See COOPERATIVES AND CONDNoMmmus 219 (J. McCoR ed. 1969).
6. R. REYNOLDS, FLORIDA CONDOMmruMS 7-8 (1971).
7. P. ROnAN & M. RESKIN, CoNDomN rM LAW AND PRACTICE § 4 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as ROHAN & RESKIN] ; Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities
Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 350
(1973); Note, Real Property-Georgia's Apartment Ownership Act-Its Scope Analyzed in
View of Emerging Condominium Litigation in Other Jurisdictions, 23 MERcER L. REV. 405
(1972).
8. See authorities collected at note 7 supra.
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 711.03(2), .12(1) (1971).
10. FLA. STAT. § 711.12(1) (1971).
11. Id.
12. FLA. STAT. § 711.12(2) (1971) provides that the association, acting through its offi-
cers, shall have the capacity of contracting, bringing suit, and being sued.
13. See note 7 supra.
14, See RoHA & RESxiN, supra note 4, at § 4.03.
CASES NOTED
only to a limited degree,'15 and thus any management contract entered
into by the condominium association which transgresses this limitation
is violative of the statutory mandate and void. Point East effectively
eliminates any attack based on the first two theories above, leaving only
the last as an open alternative.
In Fountainview Association, Inc. #4 v. Bell,1 the Supreme Court
of Florida discharged a writ of certiorari on the grounds that the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, had correctly decided the issue by hold-
ing 7 that an action against the developer would not lie merely because
the contract arose from dealings of the developers with themselves at a
time when they constituted all of the members of the condominium asso-
ciation and of the management corporation. The defendants had orga-
nized a nonprofit association incorporated pursuant to the Condominium
Act. After becoming the sole officers and members of the association, they
conveyed land to the association on inflated terms and caused the associa-
tion to enter into the management contracts with third parties at allegedly
exorbitant fees. Given the fact that the association could be incorporated
either for profit or not for profit,18 the district court held that principles
of law relating to corporations for profit could be applied to the instant
case, notwithstanding the fact that the association was a corporation
not for profit. The court was thus bound by the decision of the supreme
court in Lake Mabel Development Corp. v. Bird,0 which held that a
corporation cannot avoid a purchase of property sold to it by the pro-
moters at a large profit, while the promoters held all the outstanding
stock, since the corporation had full knowledge of the facts and the
rights of innocent purchasers had not arisen.20 Justice Ervin, dissenting
from the supreme court's discharge of the petition for certiorari, argued
in part that the Lake Mabel decision was inapplicable, in that Fountain-
view involved a situation where rights of third parties had arisen in the
form of contract subscriptions.2' Other jurisdictions have agreed with this
position, holding that once the rights of third parties have arisen in the
form of contract subscriptions, the developer then owes a fiduciary duty
to such third parties, and cannot breach that duty by entering into self-
dealing management contracts.
22
Faced with the holding that the developer has the power to contract
15. See 6 Z. CAVITCH, Busn esS ORGANIZATIONS § 126.03 (1973); 2 W. FLETCHME,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 496 (1969).
16. 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968) [hereinafter referred to as Fountainview].
17. Fountainview Ass'n, Inc. #4 v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
18. FLA. STAT. § 711.12(1) (1971).
19. 99 Fla. 253, 126 So. 356 (1930).
20. Id. at 257, 126 So. at 358.
21. Fountainview Ass'n, Inc. #4 v. Bell, 214 So. 2d 609, 611-12 (Fla. 1968) (dissenting
opinion).
22. E.g., Northridge Cooperative Sect. No. 1 v. 32nd Ave. Constr. Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 514,
161 N.Y.S.2d 404, 141 N.E.2d 802 (1957). See also Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelt-
ing Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1907).
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with himself at a time when he completely controls the association, the
condominium association in Point East attempted to attack the validity
of the management contracts in a more circumscribed fashion. Assuming
arguendo that the manner in which the contract was formed did not
invalidate it on its face, they argued that the terms of the particular
management contract to which they were bound- exceeded the scope of
statutory authority as outlined in the Condominium Act, and thus the
contracts were void.
By statute, the operation of the condominium is the responsibility
of the association, the name of which is stated in the declaration of
condominium. 8 Further, "operation of the condominium" is defined to
include the administration and management of the condominium prop-
erty.24 The stockholders or members of this association are to consist of
owners of units in the condominium.25 It thus seems clear that through
the association, the intention of the legislature was to establish an entity
responsible for the operation of the condominium, and responsive to the
condominium owners.
Contrasted to the duty imposed upon the association by statute,
the management contracts in question left the association with little or
no authority," in effect reducing them to a shell, "incapable of respond-
ing to or representing the needs or desires of their members."2 7 As stated
by the association in its brief:
The ASSOCIATIONS do not even retain the basic power of
fiscal control through the use of budgetary implementation. Any
"control" is illusory since the MANAGER retains absolute
discretion as to personnel, salaries and the purchase of equip-
ment, with absolute power to request and force increased assess-
ments to meet the cost of salaries and equipment without regard
to any previously approved budget.2"
23. FLA. STAT. § 711.12(1) (1971).
24. FLA. STAT. § 711.03(12) (1971).
25. FLA. STAT. § 711.12(1) (1971).
26. The terms of the management contract give to the manager, in part, the following
powers: (1) The right to hire, supervise, and fire, in its absolute discretion, such persons as
are required to fulfill its duties under the management contract; (2) the power to carry on
normal maintenance and repair, and expenditures up to $30,000 can be made for any item
of repair without the authorization of the association; (3) the right to purchase such equip-
ment, tools, vehicles, appliances, etc., as are reasonably necessary to perform its duties; (4)
the right to maintain, supervise, direct and conduct all programs at the Point East Com-
munity Facilities, subject only to the veto power of 51 percent of the association members;
(5) the right to retain and employ any experts or professionals whose services the manager
may reasonably require to effectively perform its duties; (6) the right to require the associa-
tion to establish an assessment sufficient to meet all of the costs and expenses of the associa-
tion and to adequately fund reserves. 282 So. 2d at 631-32 (dissenting opinion); see also
Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 7, Point East Mgt. Corp. v. Point East One Condomin-
ium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973).
27. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 18, Point East Mgt. Corp. v. Point East One
Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973).
28. Id. at 19.
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The association did not contend that the statutory language invalidated all
management contracts. Rather, they argued that a management contract
must leave the association responsible as a self-autonomous group for the
administration of the property and for the maintenance of supervision
and control over the managing party. Since the instant contracts fail to
leave such control in the association, they should be voided.
In response to this argument, the trial court concluded that:
The Management Agreements in this case, considered in light
of their specific provisions and the length of their terms, com-
pletely and effectively delegate and abdicate the responsibility
and control of the plaintiff, Condominium Associations to the
defendant. This delegation and abdication of responsibility and
control exceeds the bounds of statutory authority and defeats
the purposes of the Condominium Act.
While these Management Agreements are not contrary to public
policy, they are clearly in violation of the intent, purposes, and
authority of the Condominium Act and are, therefore, unlawful
and void.2
This holding was affirmed without substantial modification by the District
Court of Appeal, Third District. 0
The supreme court summarily dismissed the argument presented by
the association, the trial court, and the district court of appeal. After
declaring that rescission of the contracts would not lie merely because
they arose from dealings of the developers with themselves while they
constituted all of the members of the condominium associations and of
the management corporation, a point not disputed in the trial court or
on appeal, the court stated:
We cannot agree with the District Court of Appeal that the
Legislature, by placing in the condominium associations the
power and duty to manage the condominium properties, intended
to restrict the ability of the associations to contract for the
management of the associations.31
In support of this conclusion, it was argued that since the legislature
enacted a remedial statute which allowed the owners of condominium
units to cancel initial management contracts by a vote of 75 percent,3 2
it must be assumed that the legislature recognized the existence. of and
chose not to abolish such management contracts. This reasoning is at
29. Point East Mgt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 258 So. 2d 322, 324
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
30. Id.
31. 282 So. 2d at 630.
32. FLA. STAT. § 711.30 (1971). By its express terms, this statute is applicable only to
original management contracts entered into by the association subsequent to January 1, 1971,
and thus does not provide a basis for relief to the association in the instant case.
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best a non sequitur. Though this argument might support the proposition
that the association has the power to contract, it offers no answer as to
whether that power is limited. As argued by Justice Ervin in his dissent,
the fact that the legislature became more aware of the problem inherent
in such management contracts and acted to provide remedies against
future injustice does not mean that the courts are powerless to strike
down a contract clearly violative of other provisions of the Condominium
Act."8 Finally, the court concluded that since the terms of the manage-
ment contract were available to all who purchased units in the condo-
minium, enforcement of the contract against them cannot be said to
work a hardship.
The question that demands further attention is the degree to which
the association should be limited in its ability to delegate to outsiders
the authority conferred upon it by statute. An analogous situation is
found in the general limitation placed upon the board of directors of a
corporation to abdicate its total authority. 4 By statute, the directors
are given the duty and authority to manage corporate affairs."8 In mak-
ing delegations of such power, they are generally required to retain at
least supervisory control."6 Thus, management contracts are unenforce-
able if they involve abdication by the directors of the statutory duty to
manage. Those management contracts which have been invalidated on
this ground generally involve agreements which are of long duration, 7
where the board of directors does not retain important duties, 8 and
where the board does not retain the power to terminate the agreement
when in its judgment such action is necessary.3 9 In certain circumstances,
however, broad delegation has been permitted.4 0
The statutory duty placed upon the association and its officers to
manage the condominium can thus be seen as the equivalent of the
statutory duty placed upon the board of directors to manage a corpora-
tion. The limitations placed on the latter should be applicable to the
33. 282 So. 2d at 633.
34. See authorities cited at note 15 supra.
35. FLA. STAT. § 608.09(1) (1971).
36. Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953);
Adams v. Clearance Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 459, 121 A.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Long Park, Inc.
v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948). Florida courts
have recognized that the directors of a corporation are given wide discretion in the exercise
of business judgment, although their authority to delegate powers involving the exercise of
discretion and judgment is not unlimited. See Yarnall Warehouse & Transfer, Inc. v. Three
Ivory Bros. Moving Co., 226 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
37. Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633
(1948).
38. Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (Ch. 1956).
39. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 893 (1930).
40. See Galler v. Galler, 32 fI1. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964), where delegation was
permitted by a close corporation, the court finding that, as a matter of public policy, strict
adherence to statutory requirements was not necessary since there was no threat of harm to
the public, to creditors, or to shareholders who were not parties to the agreement.
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former. This view is supported by the fact that even if not incorporated,
the association is accorded certain essential attributes of a corporation.41
Even if the two situations are not analogous, it can be argued that
the limitations placed upon the board of directors to abdicate their
authority to manage the corporation are applicable, for in the instant
case the condominium association is a corporation incorporated pursuant
to statute.42 Just as Fountainview was decided on the basis of relevant
principles of corporate law, the court holding that the corporate aspect
was relevant as long as it did not conflict with the provisions of the
Condominium Act,48 so too Point East could rest on a corporate founda-
tion. Though raised by respondent in its brief,"4 the court refused to
consider this argument as controlling, and thus indirectly refused to follow
its own line of reasoning in Fountainview.
It seems clear that the Fountainview and Point East decisions, when
considered together, serve to validate any management contract entered
into by the association, regardless of whether such contract was entered
into when the developer controlled both the association and the manage-
ment corporation, and regardless of the specific terms of such contract.45
Further, by refusing to find the specific terms of the management con-
tract in Point East violative of the provisions of the Condominium Act
on the grounds that all purchasers took with notice of those terms, the
court fell back upon a traditional view of caveat emptor, in effect reject-
ing the notion that it is the court's responsibility to remedy the un-
conscionability brought about through contracts of adhesion. The court
"completely ignores the reality of unequal bargaining positions between
individual apartment purchasers and a multimillion dollar corporation
intent on foisting long-term management contracts of adhesion upon
them, contrary to regulatory law.' 46 The attitude of the court is best
stated by Justice Ervin in his dissent to Point East:
The majority has seized upon an irrelevant, outmoded case
[Lake Mabel] decided long before condominiums and their
statutory regulation were contemplated in Florida law and
41. FLA. STAT. §§ 711.11, .12 (1971). See McCaughan, supra note 4, at 25.
42. FLA. STAT. § 711.12(1) (1971).
43. Fountainview Ass'n, Inc. #4 v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
44. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 23-24, Point East Mgt. Corp. v. Point East One
Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973).
45. Such holdings might have the indirect effect of making securities regulations applica-
ble to certain sales of condominiums. A particular interest has been labeled a security when it
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Since ownership of a
condominium unit involves membership in the association, the resulting participation has, in
the past, negated the necessary reliance on third parties. However, with the validation of
long-term management contracts involving complete delegation of authority, such reliance
might be found. See Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities Law Im-
plications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 350, 360-61
(1973).
46. 282 So. 2d at.632-33 (dissenting opinion).
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used it as the conflict basis to quash the relief afforded below.
In vain have the Legislature and the lower courts attempted to
provide remedies to condominium associations for patent devel-
opers' fraud and overreaching, always running afoul of curiously
irrelevant decisions at this level.
The enigmatic formulation of another ill-founded decision in
this area of the law only serves to put Florida further out of
touch with the holdings of most jurisdictions. 7
MARc COOPER
GARAGEMAN'S LIEN: APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
Appellant, the owner of an automobile, was served with a notice of
sale advising him that in the event a bill for repairs was not paid, his
car, which was in the possession of a garageman, would be sold at a public
auction under the New York garageman's lien statute.1 The owner con-
tended that the repairs were not only unauthorized, but that the amount
charged by the garageman was unreasonable. After efforts to mediate the
dispute over the cost of repairs failed, appellant filed a complaint in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the statute violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and an order enjoining the garageman from fore-
closing the lien.2 The complaint was dismissed and the automobile was
sold without a prior judicial determination of the amount claimed by
47. 282 So. 2d at 634.
1. N.Y. LIEN LAw §§ 184, 200-02, 204 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
2. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The
jurisdiction of the district court was invoked under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides that the district court shall have original jurisdiction
over any civil action:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jutisdiction of the United States . ...
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), providing for a three-judge court in actions challenging the con-
stitutionality of a state law, was held inapplicable since no state officer was named as a party
defendant to the law suit. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313,
316-317 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
